April, 7929

ASSISTANCE OR MANUAL AID IN SIGNING OR
AFFIXING MARK TO WILLS IN PENNSYLVANIA
ALBERT SMITH FAUGHT

I.

During recent years the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has
rendered two decisions relating to the effect of giving manual
aid to a testator in signing his name to his written will; and a
third decision has been handed down on the kindred topic of the
execution of a will by means of a mark. These decisions, announced in March, April and May of 1927, indicate the present
uncertainty of the legal profession as to the exact circumstances
under which a testator may be aided in signing his will or may
be allowed to execute his will by a mark or cross.
In Brehony v. Brehony,! the Court of Common Pleas had
tried at law an issue framed by the Orphans' Court as to whether
the name of a blind testatrix had been forged because her hand
had been guided by another when she signed her name at the
end of her will. The jury found that the signature was a forgery, but the trial judge set aside the verdict and entered judgment in favor of the proponents. This judgment was affirmed
by the Supreme Court.
The Orphans' Court in Wagner's Estate 2 sustained an appeal from the Register of Wills admitting an instrument to probate, and refused to direct an issue to the Court of Common
Pleas after finding that the testatrix lacked testamentary capacity, that undue influence had been used, and that the testatrix's
signature was affixed with the manual aid of the chief proponent. The Supreme Court affirmed the decree of the Orphans'
Court.
Finally in Carmello's Estate,3 the Orphans' Court dismissed
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an appeal from the Register of Wills, admitting a will to probate
which had been signed by the scrivener in the presence of the
testator, who had merely affixed thereto his mark. The Supreme
Court affirmed the decree of the Orphans' Court, commenting
that the inability of the testator to sign his own name by reason
of physical weakness had been sufficiently shown.
II.
There should be but little doubt in the minds of either bench
or bar as to the exact circumstances under which a testator may:
(i) use a mark instead of a signature to a written will; (2) cause
his name to be signed for him in lieu of signing the written will
himself; or (3) receive manual aid in signing his name or in
making his mark to his will. The answer to these questions is
found in the legislative history of the various Pennsylvania statutes of wills, and in the judicial history of the meaning of the
word signature as applied to testamentary instruments. Recourse
to this judicial history is necessary because, as pointed out in
Knox's Estate:
"the legislature not having concerned itself with what should
be deemed a signing, we must look dehors the statute for
a definition."

4

Mr. Justice Mitchell in Knox's Estate gives a brief resume
of both the legislative and judicial history with which we are
concerned, and presents a picture of the law which remained
substantially unchanged until the passage of the Wills Act of
19g7, modifying the statutory requirements as to the execution
of wills:
"The condition of the law before the passage of the
wills act of 1833 is well known. By the English statute of
frauds all wills as to land were required to be in writing,
signed by the testator. Under this act it was held that the
signature of the testator in any part of the instrument was
sufficient: i Redf. on Wills, c. 6, § i8, pl. 9,and cases there
'131 Pa. 220, 229, 18 Atl. io2i, 1022 (1889).
This was quoted with approval in Kimmel's Estate, 278 Pa. 435, 441, 123 Atl. 405, 4o6 (1924).
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cited. The same construction was given to the law in Penn.
sylvania, and under the act of 1705, I Sm. L. 33, which required wills of land to be in writing, and proved by two or
more credible witnesses, etc., it was even held that a writing
in the hand of another, not signed by the testator at all,
might be a good will: Rohrer v. Stehman, I W. 463. In
this state of the law the act of 1833 was passed. It was
founded on the English statute of frauds, 29 Car. II., the
phraseology of which it follows closely, but with the important addition that the will shall be signed 'at the end thereof.'
In making this change, it is undoubtedly true, as suggested
by STRONG, J., in Vernon v. Kirk, 3o Pa. 222, that the legislature 'looked less to the mode of the signature than to its
place.' Accordingly, the statute makes no definition of a
signature, or of the word, signed. 'It was only by judicial
construction that . . . (the statute) was made to require
. . . the testator's signature by his name:' STRONG, J.,
Vernon v. Kirk; and that judicial construction which held
that a mark was not a valid signature: Asay v. Hoover,
5 Pa. 2I; Grabill v. Barr, 5 Pa. 441, decided in 1846, was
changed, it may be noted, by the legislature as soon as their
attention was directed to it: Act January 27, 1848, P. L.
16.)15
Mr. Justice Mitchell then adds:
"The purposes of the act of 1833 were accuracy in the
transmission of the testator's wishes, the authentication of
the instrument transmitting them, the identification of the
testator, and certainty as to his completed testamentary purpose. The first was attained by requiring writing instead of
mere memory of witnesses, the second and third by the signature of testator, and the last by placing the signature at
the end of the instrument. The first two requirements were
derived from the English statute; the third was new, (since
followed by the act of I Vict. c. 26), and was the result of
experience of the dangers of having mere memoranda or
incomplete directions taken for the expression of final intention: Baker's App., 107 Pa. 381; Vernon v. Kirk, 30
Pa. 223." 6
'Ibid.

228,
'Ibid. 229,

i8 At. at lO22.
18 AUt. at 1022.
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Without further elaboration it may be said that:
" 'exactly what constitutes a signing has never been reduced
to a judicial formula . . . whatever the testator or grantor
was shown to have intended as his signature was a valid
signing, no matter how imperfect or unfinished or fantastical or illegible, or even false, the separate characters or
symbols he used, might be, when critically judged.'" 7
Accordingly the following may constitute a signature when so
intended by the signer: the first name; 8 a fictitious name; 9 an
endorsement of figures; 10 a nickname such as "father";" and
initials where the rest of the name is impressed by a pen of which
the ink has run dry.' 2
The closest approach to a judicial definition of a signature
appears per curiam in Brennan's Estate:
"Signing in the usual acceptation of the word and in the
sense in which, presumably, it is used in the act is the writing of a name or the affixing of what is meant as a signature." 13
Accordingly it is sufficient although the handwriting be illegible,' 4 or as in the case of the signature of Rufus Choate, "no man,
unaided, could discover what the ragged marks made by (him)
. . were intended to represent." 15
While under the English Statute of Frauds marks and signatures imperceptibly grade into each other, this is no longer true
in Pennsylvania; and a sharp distinction should now be drawn
between a "mark or crosg" and a signature. Under Section 3
1 Plate's Estate, 148 Pa. 55, 60, 23 Atl. 1o38 (1892). The court is quoting
the lower court's opinion.
'Knox's Estate, supra note 4.
'Williamson v. Johnson, I B. & C. 146 (1823); Main v. Ryder, 84 Pa. 217
(1877).
" Brown v. Butchers' & Drovers' Bank, 6 Hill 443 (N. Y. 1844).
"Kimmel's Estate, supra note 4; Brennan's Estate, 244 Pa. 574, 91 Atl.

(194).
'In re Jacob's Will, 21 W. N. C. 5io (Reg. of Wills, Phila. 1888).
"Supra note 1i, at 581, 91 Atl. at 222.
"Kris's Estate, 30 Pa. Dist. 166 (i92o).
'Knox's Estate, supra note 4, at 231, 18 Atl. at 1023.
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of the Wills Act of 1917 16 it is now provided that, when a testator is unable to sign his name for other reason than the extremity of his last sickness, he must nevertheless, if able to do so,
make his mark or cross. As pointed out later in this article,
the validity of an instrument may turn on whether particular
strokes are intended as a signature or as a "mark or cross." As
a means of determining whether certain strokes are intended as
a signature or as a "mark or cross," evidence of the17 testator's
habits and customs may be of controlling importance.
llI.

The able commissioners who drafted the revised laws of
1917 relating to decedent's estates give no hint in their commen-

tary on Section 3 of the new Wills Act that their "clarification"
of Section i of the Act of 1848 18 made important changes in
the law relating to the execution of written wills by a mark or
cross.
Under the law as it stood before the codification of 1917, a
testator, although able to write his name and subscribe his signature to his will, was wholly free to execute the instrument by his
mark instead of by his signature. This was the decision of the
Supreme Court in Main v. Ryder,19 decided in 1877. In the opinion it was said:
"It is contended that the Act of 1848 applies only to
cases where the testator is unable to write his name by reason of want of education, and does not excuse the absence of
the signature of one who is able to write. We discover nothing in the act sustaining this view. It makes no mention
of insufficient education or of physical inability. It declares
that form of execution as sufficient in all cases?' 20
The privilege of executing a will by a cross or mark has
been taken away in all cases except when the testator is in fact
2"P. L. 403, § 3 (917),

PA. STAT.

(West i92o) § 8309.

"Perry's Estate, 67 Pitts. L. J. 216 (917).

"P. L. 16, § 1 (1848).
"Supra note 9.
"Main v. Ryder, supra note 9, at 223.
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unable to sign his name. The text of Section 3 of the Wills Act
of 1917 now reads:
"Section 3. If the testator be unable to sign his name,
for any reason other than the extremity of his last sickness,
a will to which his name is subscribed in his presence, by his
direction and authority, and to which he makes his mark or
cross, unless unable so to do,-in which case the mark or
cross shall not be required,-shall be as valid as though he
had signed his name thereto: Provided, That such will shall
be proved by the oaths or affirmations of two or more competent witnesses." 21
Furthermore it should be noted that, as pointed out in
Perry's Estate,22 the conjunctive "and" which we have italicized
was substituted by the Act of 1917 for the previous disjunctive
"or". Formerly a will was deemed properly executed if the testator affixed his mark, although he neither signed his name nor
caused another to sign it in his presence. The writing of the
testator's name was not included in the list of essential steps
which must be established for the probate of a will to which the
testator had affixed his mark. This appears from the opinion
2 3
of Mr. Justice Walling in W'hite's Estate,
decided in 1918, concerning the will of a decedent who died in 1914:
"It is not essential to the validity of a will to prove
more by the witnesses, who were present at its execution,
than the identity of the instrument, that they saw the testator subscribe or make his mark, and at the time of the doing
thereof he was of sound disposing mind, memory and understanding: Combs' and Hankinson's App., 105 Pa. 155."
In these two particulars, therefore, the requirements for executing a valid will were stiffened by the revised Wills Act of
1917. Resort to a cross or mark is now permissible only when
the testator is unable to sign the will; and, when the will is executed by a cross or mark, not only must the testator affix his mark
or cross if able, but his name must be subscribed in his presence
and by his direction and authority.
' Supra note 16. The italics are the author's.
'Supra note 17.
2262
Pa. 356, 361, 1o5 Atl. 549, 551 (91S).
The italics are the author's.
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Yet an express request to another to sign the testator's signature is unnecessary. The "direction and authority" may be
inferred from the fact that the testator saw his name written
on the document or was in a position to observe the performance of this act, and knew the nature of the document which was
signed in his name. The action of the testator in then placing
24
his mark is evidence of his approval of what has been done.

IV.
Let us next consider the question as to the effect of manual
aid being given to a testator in either signing his name or affixing his mark. On this point the law is clearly established that
physical assistance does not militate against the validity of the
will. The recent case of Brehony v. Brehony,25 holding that a
will is not invalidated by physical assistance in the act of its signing, is supported by McClure v. Redman,26 following the early
case of Rees v. StiUi,27 in which it was said:
"That a part of the name was written with the aid of
another person's holding the hand or guiding the pen does
not make the signature any the less that of the alleged testator. This has many times been decided."
Nor is it necessary to prove any express request from the
testator for assistance in the physical act of signing his name. 28
The same holds true of the giving of manual assistance to a testator when he affixes his mark.2 9 His mere touching of the pen
is sufficient.3 0 No express request for assistance is necessary. s 1
"Girard Trust Co. v. Page, 282 Pa. 174, 127 Atl. 458 (925)

; Hughes's

Estate, 286 Pa. 466, 133 Atl. 645 (1926) ; Reilly's Estate, 9 Pa. D. & C. 538
(1927), aff'd on another point in 9z Pa. Super. 314 (1927) ; Cairn's Estate, 9
Pa. D. & C. 512 (i927).
' Supra note i.

263 Pa. 405, io7 Atl. 25 (1919).
=38 Pa. 138, 144 (i86i).

257

'Vandruff v. Rinehart, 29 Pa.

232

(1857); Shotwell's Estate, i Pa. Dist.

(1892).

Girard Trust Co. v. Page, supra note 24.
"Novicki v. O'Mara, 28o Pa. 411, i24 Atl. 672 (924); Main v. Ryder,

supra note 9.
' Novicki v. O'Mara, supra note 30, citing Cozzen's Will, 6i Pa. 196 (1869).
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V.

Finally it should be mentioned that the privilege which a testator formerly enjoyed of expressly asking another to sign his
will for him in his presence, even when the testator is himself
able to sign it, has not been impaired by the revised Wills Act
of 1917. It was pointed out in Brennan's Estate,32 that:
"A testator need not sign with his own hand; he may
if he choose, direct another to do so for him in his presence, and the signing is sufficient, and that too, although the
testator is able to write his name."
Section 2 of the revised Wills Act of I9M7 3 makes no change
in the text or in the law relating to deputizing another by an
express request to sign the will for the testator in his presence.
We may now answer the questions already asked as to the
circumstances under which a testator may use a mark, or have his
name signed for him, or receive manual aid in signing his name
or making his mark to his will.
i. Since 1917 a testator has no longer the general privilege
of executing his will by his mark. He may do so only when
unable to sign his name. While it is not necessary that his signature be his full name or true name, or be more than initials or
some symbol which he intends as his signature, the symbol must
be more than a mere cross-mark, and in case of doubt evidence
of the testator's habits in using such symbol is admissible to indicate his intention. If the testator affixes a mark or cross without signing his name, his name should be signed by another in his
presence and by his direction and authority. The authority may
be implied and need not be an express request. The authority
may be inferred from the fact that the testator saw the name
written and then signified his approval of the act by placing his
34
mark under the signature.
2 Supra

note ii, at 578. The quotation is from the opinion of Sando, P. J.,
approved by the Supreme
229, 231 (912),

in the Orphans' Court, 13 Lack. Jur.

Court
"P. L. 403, §2 (9W7), PA. STAT. (West i92o) § 83o8.
Novicki v. O'Mara, supra note 30; Girard Trust Co. v. Page, Hughes's
Estate, both supra note 24.
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2. A testator still has the right to request another to sign
the testator's name to his will in his presence, even if the testator
is able to sign his own name, but the request must be an express
35
one and not merely implied.
3. The validity of the testator's act in signing his name or
affixing his mark or cross is in no wise impaired by his receiving
manual aid. Such assistance does not give rise to a charge of
forgery. However, the testator must have sufficient testamentary capacity at the time to know what he is doing when his hand
is guided in either signing his name or affixing his mark or cross.
As was said by the Orphans' Court of Philadelphia in Shotwell's
Estate:
"But it was her act if she knowingly accepted the aid,
and this introduces the question of her mental capacity." 31
Picconi's Estate, 4 Pa. D. & C. 245 (1924).
" Supranote 28, at 257.

